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Abstract
This paper presents arguments purporting to show that von Neumann’s
description of the measurement process in quantum mechanics has a modern
day version in the decoherence approach. We claim that this approach and the
de Broglie-Bohm theory emerge from Bohr’s interpretation and are therefore
obliged to deal with some obscure ideas which were anticipated, explicitly or
implicitly and carefully circumvented, by Bohr.
I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of quantum physics imposes on physicists an unavoidable ambiguity when
describing atomic and subatomic systems. On his/her daily activity in the laboratory,
the physicist describes and calculates classical trajectories of particles in order not only
to interpret the data, but also to design the apparatus producing that data. Witness,
for example, how a high energy physicist reconstructs events involving a maze of particles
produced in a complex subatomic collision. He/She rarely uses any quantum mechanics at
all, determining trajectories, lifetimes, vertex positions, trigger algorithms, all with classical
relativistic mechanics. Bohr was perfectly aware of this necessity of using classical language
for describing the results of experiments and constructed his interpretation of quantum
mechanics based on this (Bohr 1939). The need for a classical language is imposed, according
to him, by the classical nature of observers and experimental apparatuses. It is fair to say
that for Bohr there was no measurement problem, as classical apparatuses are not described
by wave functions, avoiding superpositions of macroscopic states. Wave functions pertain
only to the microscopic world. The problem as it is recognized today can be traced back to
von Neumann.
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We argue in this paper that von Neumann’s interpretation of quantum mechanics (von
Neumann 1955) originated in an attempt to remove the somewhat arbitrary division between
the classical and the quantum world introduced by Bohr. In so doing, von Neumann shifted
the cut by introducing an observer, who was not required by Bohr.
Modern attempts to solve the measurement problem introducing the environment to
dissipate macroscopic coherence do not explain the collapse of the wave function. We argue
in the text that decoherence models (Zurek 1998) are true descendants of von Neumann and
therefore will ultimately bring the observer to the forefront. Consequently, the decoherence
approaches are not a solution of the measurement problem if one’s standing point is that
the observer should not play a role in the interpretation.
We further argue that the causal approach, introduced by de Broglie and developed by
Bohm and collaborators (Bohm 1952 and 1995), also originated in an effort to better deal
with the division of the world. The causal approach removed it by combining classical and
quantum concepts in a single description of nature: from the classical world it takes the
position of the particles (be they part of the system or of the measuring device), while
keeping from the quantum world the wave function and its Schro¨dinger’s evolution.
We also bring forward our view that von Neumann’s (and its modern day version -
decoherence) and the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, though corresponding to two different
branches emerging from Bohr’s elaborate world view, dealt in their own specific way with
the vague concept of information and the quite obscure notion of its disappearance.
II. BOHR
With a long historical hindsight, we can now see Bohr’s position as one that intended to
provide an interpretation, whose main purpose was to protect the successful formalism of
quantum mechanics. We might say that Bohr anticipated many of the problems that would
be faced by those who would later try to analyze in detail the measurement process. As
we will show below, the attempts presented here to solve the measurement have to answer
questions that do not pertain to the daily activity of an experimenter in the laboratory.
Bohr somehow foresaw these inextricable difficulties and cut them short by declaring (Bohr
1939):
‘In the system to which the quantum mechanical formalism is applied, it is of course
possible to include any intermediate auxiliary agency employed in the measuring process
[but] some ultimate measuring instruments must always be described entirely on classical
lines, and consequently kept outside the system subject to quantum mechanical treatment.’
Although Bohr’s position was a strong and deeply intricate one, it was challenged by one
simple criticism: where is the demarcation between system and apparatus, quantum and
classical?
‘The ‘Problem’ then is this: how exactly is the world to be divided into speakable
apparatus ... that we can talk about ... and unspeakable quantum system that we can
not talk about? How many electrons, or atoms, or molecules, make an ‘apparatus’? The
mathematics of the ordinary theory requires such a division, but says nothing about how it
is to be made. In practice the question is resolved by pragmatic recipes which have stood
the test of time, applied with discretion and good taste born of experience. But should not
fundamental theory permit exact mathematical formulation?’ (Bell 1987, 171)
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Though simple, this question has a devastating effect on Bohr’s interpretation. This
quotation from Bell summarizes the challenge and motivation for those who felt the urge to
explain the measurement process despite the best advice against it by Bohr.
III. VON NEUMANN
Von Neumann was probably the first to attempt a unified quantum description of system
and apparatus. Contrary to Bohr, who avoided the danger of such a description by con-
structing a philosophical fortress around quantum mechanics, von Neumann made a formal
analysis of the measurement process and ended up by arriving at an altogether new inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics, which no wonder is frequently misidentified with Bohr’s
philosophical constructs. As stressed by Feyerabend (Feyerabend 1962, 237):
‘when dealing with von Neumann’s investigation, we are not dealing with a refinement
of Bohr - we are dealing with a completely different approach.’
Like Bohr, von Neumann attributed importance to the apparatus as part of the measure-
ment process, but he examined the evolution of the joint system (system + apparatus) with
a single wave function governed by Schro¨dinger’s evolution, which establishes a correlation
between them in such a way that any result pertaining to the system is inferred from the
reading of the apparatus.
In doing so, the states of the apparatus are also subjected to the superposition prin-
ciple. Clearly von Neumann managed to move the classical/quantum cut from the sys-
tem/apparatus boundary, but at the price of leaving the apparatus in a coherent superpo-
sition of states which is not observed. No matter how many apparatuses are included, the
superpositions will remain. At this stage von Neumann distinguished two types of processes
in quantum mechanics: the one described above, leading to undesirable macroscopic super-
positions as a consequence of the reversible unitary evolution of Schro¨dinger’s equation and
the other one, corresponding to our knowledge of the result of the measurement, which is
irreversible. Following Bohr,
‘it is also essential to remember that all unambiguous information concerning atomic ob-
ject is derived from the permanent marks... left on the bodies which define the experimental
conditions. Far from involving any special intricacy, the irreversible amplification effects on
which the recording of the presence of atomic objects rests rather remind us of the essential
irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation.’ (Bohr 1964, 3)
Von Neumann formalized the irreversibility in quantum mechanics by postulating the
collapse of the wave function. Notice, though, that he deals with ensembles and therefore
uses density matrices in his formalism. To avoid imposing the postulate without any physical
justification, the observer is introduced and his/her subjective perception becomes essential.
This interpretation is thereby weakened and open to severe criticisms. The cut is still
present, but has now moved to a position between joint system/observer.
In addition to interpretative and epistemological problems, this interpretation also has
problems in its formalism. The need to consider instantaneous interactions in the measure-
ment process, so that the unitary evolution does not move the state vector away from the
position of measurement, implies that the Hamiltonian for the joint system commutes with
the observable which is being measured [H,O] = 0. This could be a demanding condi-
tion on the Hamiltonian, but not an excessive one, as we will make clear when discussing
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decoherence.
IV. DECOHERENCE
Von Neumann’s approach is taken one step further in the decoherence models. These
models invoke the inevitable interaction between joint system and environment to help solv-
ing, it is claimed, the measurement problem. Following von Neumann’s tradition, system,
apparatus and environment are treated quantum mechanically and, as for von Neumann,
the unavoidable superposition of macroscopically different states will still be present. As the
environment has a large number of degrees of freedom, the observer has no access to them
and therefore, they must be traced over, ignored. Notice that the observer still plays a cru-
cial role in this approach, for the trace must be done by someone and the cut is maintained
as the boundary between the degrees of freedom which are traced over and those which are
not. The inevitability of this division of the world is acknowledged by the proponents of this
approach as illustrated by Zurek in a recent paper (Zurek 1998, 1794):
‘We can mention two such open issues right away: both the formulation of the measure-
ment problem and its resolution through the appeal of decoherence require a universe split
into systems.’
The trick of tracing over the unaccessible degrees of freedom brings the density matrix
of the total system to a diagonal form removing the undesirable macroscopic superpositions
and this is von Neumann’s postulate presented in a more elaborate dynamical way. However,
there is a subjective element in the whole procedure: how far does the environment reach?
Von Neumann’s condition of commutativity of the Hamiltonian and the observable to
be measured, now acquires a complex meaning: [Hint, A], where now A is the pointer basis
of the apparatus and the Hamiltonian refers to the interaction between joint system and
environment, for which there is even less control by an experimental physicist. It is as
if a measuring instrument should bring in its instruction manual recommendations on the
appropriate environment where to operate. Von Neumann’s condition only indicated the
adequate apparatuses for measuring a certain observable. Demands put on the experimenter
do not stop here however, he/she - according to the decoherence procedure known as the
predictability sieve (Zurek 1993) - should refer to a list to decide which observable can be
measured, those on the top of the list are more classical in appearance and thus preferable
for measurement. The existence of such a list brings back the subjectivity in the choice of
where to put the quantum/classical cut, which is ‘to be decided by circumstances’ (Zurek
1993). Besides, how is it possible to know the environment well enough to decide which
observable can be measured, but at the same time to be so ignorant about it that one is
obliged to trace it over?
One of the worst aspects of the decoherence approach, taken to its ultimate consequence,
is thus to introduce a set of procedures that should be obeyed when measuring a quantity,
procedures which no experimentalist on his/her right mind would recognize as what goes
on in the laboratory. The appeal to notions far remote from the reality of the laboratory
experiments is well illustrated in the following passages in a recent paper on decoherence
(Zurek 1998, 1796 and 1799).
‘Correlations [between states of the joint system and environment] are both the cause of
decoherence and the criterion used to evaluate the stability of the states...Moreover, stability
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of the correlations between the states of the system monitored by their environment and of
some other ‘recording’ system (i.e. an apparatus or a memory of an observer) is a criterion
of the ‘reality’ of these states.’
or still,
‘the observer can know beforehand what (limited) set of observables can be measured
with impunity. He will be able to select measurement observables that are already monitored
by the environment.’
The above passages clearly show some subjective elements of this approach, invoking
memory of observer or a priori knowledge of the interaction between the environment and
joint system.
One last criticism is that decoherence, as well as von Neumann, deals with the density
matrix, which is by force in the realm of the ensemble interpretation and as Bell says:
‘If one were not actually on the look-out for probabilities, I think the obvious interpreta-
tion of even [the butchered density matrix] would be that the system is in a state in which
the various [wave functions] somehow co-exist...This is not at all a probability interpretation,
in which the different terms are seen not as co-existing, but as alternatives.’ (Bell 1990, 36
[ref.2] and Whitaker 1996, 289)
V. DE BROGLIE - BOHM
A description of individual events was proposed by de Broglie-Bohm (Bohm 1952). In it,
an individual system is described by a wave function and a particle. The particle is guided
by the wave function, which works, to a certain extent, like a field. One could say that this
theory corresponds to a refinement of Bohr’s duality - the use of quantum concepts in a scale
and classical concepts in another one - taken to an extreme. The wave function and the
particle position are now used at the same time in all scales. It thus eliminates the division
quantum/classical and apparently has no measurement problem, as the particle has always
a definite position. Moreover, it claims to be free from problems connected with the act of
observation, contrary to what we will suggest below.
It is arguably that this theory is subjected to some serious criticisms (Holland 1993), but
the only one we want to emphasize here is related to the infamous empty wave and more
specifically, to the information carried by it. Whenever the wave splits up into parts which
do not have spatial overlap, such as in the trajectories of the double-slit experiment, one
part will be with the particle and the other one will be empty, though it can still influence
the particle motion. The empty wave carries information on the superpositions of states,
but as soon as a measurement is realized, the empty wave loses any overlap it had before
with the branch that carries the particle.
‘Perhaps we shouldn’t talk about it actually disappearing from the universe. Rather the
information in the ‘empty’ wave packet no longer has any effect, because during the act of
measurement the irreversible process introduces a stochastic or random disturbance which
destroys the information of quantum potential of the wave packet.’ (Hiley 1986, 146)
Suddenly the superpositions are destroyed, this only happens thanks to the measurement
which identifies which branch corresponds to the empty wave. How this happens, where
the empty wave information is taken to, what are the effects of its disappearance on the
surroundings are left unspecified. This sends us back to the similar problem encountered
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in the decoherence models, where information - as before, information on superpositions of
states - was dissipated into an environment with no observable effects on it, but only on the
system.
At this point the convergence of these two apparently different interpretations becomes
clear. If one accepts the concept of information as they do, the act of measurement implies
its loss, be it dissipated in the environment or in the arbitrary sterilization of the empty
wave, whose information is now declared passive:
‘we’ve tried to introduce a distinction between active information and inactive informa-
tion. That is, when an apparatus has undergone this irreversible change, one wave packet
becomes inactive.’ (Hiley 1986, 146)
This vague notion of information is central to both causal and decoherence interpreta-
tions. Its vagueness has been nicely expressed by Bell (Bell 1990, 8 [ref.3]):
‘I don’t have a concept of disembodied information - it must be located and represented in
the material world, and I don’t know how to formulate the concept of how much information
there is in an arbitrary space region - I think the concept of information is again a very useful
one in practice but not in principle...’
This concludes our arguments. It is certainly frustrating that the measurement problem
in quantum mechanics, after six decades of being delineated, remains open. Perhaps this
indicates a fundamentally new epistemological obstacle to be overcome jointly by physicists
and philosophers, an obstacle that was not present in classical physics.
VI. CONCLUSION
We argued in this paper that von Neumann’s approach (and its modern version: decoher-
ence) and the causal interpretation have many points in common, despite being so different
in formalism and in language. Remarkably the common points are the problematic ones
springing from Bohr’s deep analysis of the interface quantum/classical. These elaborated
attempts to define quantitatively what happens in this boundary have exposed open unsur-
mountable problems which Bohr carefully avoided by his radical separation of classical and
quantum.
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